Periodically, I get emails from media relations firms on behalf of American Task Force Argentina, a somewhat hard-to-pin-down group organized, as best I can tell, to lobby the US government to pressure Argentina to pay holdouts like Elliott Associates. (ATFA's website lists Elliott as one of its "Members and Supporters.") Yesterday, an email informed me that a group of Argentine pensioners who held out from the country's 2001 restructuring will hold a press conference January 29 in New York at the Warwick Hotel to share "stories of hardship and sacrifice." I probably won't be going – although the Warwick does sound nice (a four-star "oasis of quiet luxury" with a "refreshing blend of grandeur and intimacy") – and not only because I have to teach two classes that day.

Snarkiness aside, this is a useful reminder that not all holdouts are well-heeled hedge fund types. As Anna has noted, selling such risky investments to retail investors is a questionable practice. (Although I'm on the fence; historical evidence – summarized here, pp. 151-154 – suggests that higher yields have sometimes been sufficient to compensate investors in foreign bonds notwithstanding default risk.) There are plenty of small retail holders of Argentine debt in Argentina and elsewhere. For years, sovereign debt litigation – or at least, successful sovereign debt litigation – has been a rich person's game. That's because it takes real patience and resources to enforce a judgment against a sovereign. On February 27, the Second Circuit is scheduled to hear the next phase of arguments in NML v. Argentina. To me, the case is significant primarily because the court has managed to fashion a remedy with real teeth. If the court continues down this path and leaves the injunction against
Argentina in place, it will be interesting to see whether the decision
makes litigation a viable option for the non-hedge-fund types.