Author: David Moss

  • Transforming the Way We Finance Higher Education

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    In my various posts this week, I’ve focused on some of the problems that afflict our current system for financing higher education.  The new approach I’ve suggested would ensure that every American could pay for college on the basis of income-contingent federal loans. 

    A comprehensive income-contingent-lending (ICL) program would transform the way we finance education
    and training in this country, much as social security transformed
    the way we finance retirement. In fact, such a program might be thought of, roughly, as social security in
    reverse. Instead of paying-in over one’s
    working life to finance retirement (i.e., once one’s human capital is
    depleted), an ICL program would allow a young person to build human capital up
    front and then spread the cost over his or her working life. Like social security, an ICL program would
    allow Americans to cover risks they couldn’t otherwise cover on their own, and
    it would take advantage of the withholding system to simplify and streamline
    administration.

    The ultimate investment
    we can make as a society is an investment in the education of our young
    people. Sadly, our existing system for
    financing higher education is hopelessly inefficient and complex – and this, at
    a time when the benefits of higher education have never been more clear. We can do better. A comprehensive ICL program would be like a
    GI bill for everyone, but one that would also pay for itself over the long
    term. Social security transformed
    retirement by changing the way we finance it. It’s time we do the same for education.

     

  • Precedents for Income-Contingent Lending, at Home and Abroad

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    Earlier this week, I suggested that we consider a new system of income-contingent lending (ICL) to ensure that every American can cover the cost of higher education.  Surprisingly,
    the notion of income-contingent lending, now viewed as a liberal idea, was
    originally conceived by a well-known conservative economist. Milton Friedman suggested a federal ICL-style
    program to help finance professional education as early as 1945, and he
    extended the proposal ten years later to cover virtually all higher
    education.

    In Friedman’s view, the
    market system on its own produced “underinvestment in human capital” as a
    result of “an imperfection in the capital market.” Private lending for investment in human
    capital (education) was far riskier than for investment in physical capital
    (plant and equipment) because the former could not be collateralized – i.e., because
    slavery was prohibited. The government,
    however, could effectively collateralize human capital given its power to tax
    future earnings. As a result, a federal
    ICL program would, in Friedman’s words, “make capital more widely available [to
    students] and would thereby do much to make equality of opportunity a reality,
    to diminish inequalities of income and wealth, and to promote the full use of
    our human resources.”[1]

    The economist (and
    Kennedy advisor) James Tobin not only supported the idea of income-contingent lending, he actually helped put such a
    system in place at Yale University in the early
    1970s. Yale’s Tuition Postponement
    Option obligated borrowers to pay 0.4% of their adjusted gross income, for up
    to 35 years (or until their cohort had repaid its debt in full), on each $1000
    of tuition postponed (borrowed). The
    repayment schedule included both a minimum ($29 per $1000 borrowed) and a
    maximum (150% of principal, scaled up year by year according to a variable
    interest rate). The program was
    ultimately terminated in 1978, in large part because of problems with
    collection and unexpectedly high payments required of high-income
    graduates. Still, the program offers
    important clues about how best to structure a federal ICL program. It also helped many students from low-income
    families afford a Yale education, including one particular Yale law student
    named Bill Clinton.

    In fact, it was probably
    no coincidence that as President,Clinton initially favored an income-contingent approach in reforming the nation’s
    system of financial aid. Yet his ICL
    proposal faced strong opposition from private lenders. In the end, the watered-down version of an ICL
    plan that President Clinton signed into law in 1993 was so weak that it had
    barely any effect on student borrowing and has gone largely unnoticed.

    The ICL idea was
    employed with considerably greater success – and fanfare – abroad. Beginning in the late 1980s, a number of
    countries adopted ICL programs to help cover university tuition, including Australia (1989), New
    Zealand (1992), and the United Kingdom (1997).[2] Although many of these programs appear to be
    working well, it is doubtful that any would be directly transferable to the United States,
    given substantial differences in country context. Most of the foreign programs, for example, exhibit
    only a weak market orientation – in most cases charging no interest on loans. The sums involved are also much smaller than
    they would be here, since the U.S. is effectively in a league of its own with respect to tuition levels. Still, the spread of income-contingent
    lending overseas is important, reflecting the broad appeal of the idea and providing
    a solid empirical basis for determining the best ways to structure a program
    here at home.


    [1] In fact, Friedman’s proposal
    went further than the one I outlined in my last post, since Friedman’s plan would have required students
    to repay to the federal government a fixed percentage of their future income
    indefinitely, rather than simply to repay their own individual loans. He characterized this as an equity
    arrangement (instead of debt), whereby the government would “’buy’ a share in
    an individual’s earning prospects.” To
    simplify administration, he recommended that “the appropriate unit of
    government to make funds available is the Federal government….” See Milton Friedman, “The Role of Government
    in Education,” in Economics and the
    Public Interest
    , ed. Robert A. Solo (New Brunswick: Rutgers University
    Press, 1955).

    [2] This paragraph draws on
    Yael Shavit, “Promoting Equal Access to Higher Education: the Past and Future
    of Income Contingent Loans,” unpublished draft, January 2007. While program details vary from country to
    country, Australia’s
    program is reasonably typical: students can borrow up to the cost of tuition
    and, after graduation, pay 4-8 percent of their income each year until the
    principal (adjusted for inflation) is fully repaid. No payment is required in any year in which
    the borrower’s income falls below a threshold level, which currently stands at
    about AU$38,000 (approximately US$30,000).

  • Promoting Investment in Education through Income-Contingent Lending

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    In yesterday’s post, I identified a number of problems with
    our current system for financing higher education, and I promised that I would
    suggest a new approach.

    The option I think we should strongly consider is to ensure
    that every American can finance college or graduate-school tuition (or the cost
    of job training) with a special income-contingent federal loan. The loan would have an extended term (up to
    30 years, like a mortgage) and would defer or potentially forgive interest
    payments for any year in which the recipient’s household income fell below a
    pre-specified trigger.

    Income-contingent
    lending for education is certainly not a new idea. In the past, its intellectual champions
    included both Milton Friedman and James Tobin, two Nobel laureates in economics
    from opposite ends of the political spectrum. Among politicians, key supporters have included Congressman Thomas
    Petri, Republican from Wisconsin, and former
    Senator Bill Bradley, Democrat from New Jersey. The
    idea has broad appeal because it addresses an important weakness in our market
    system.

    Just as limited
    liability law encourages investment in financial capital, an income-contingent-loan
    program would encourage investment in human capital by limiting the investor’s
    downside risk. In my view, it would
    represent a vital – and ultimately self-financing – policy innovation for the
    information age.

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  • In Need of a New Approach for Financing Higher Education

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    Over the course of this
    week, I want to discuss student loans, including the inadequacies of the
    existing system for financing higher education and a potential strategy for
    improving it.
     
    As I see it, the current
    patchwork of programs for covering college tuition makes little sense. The system is maddeningly complex. What’s worse, it does a poor job of managing
    risk and assessing need, and it actually discourages household saving. Most student loans, moreover, require
    borrowers to bear the heaviest burden when their earning power is lowest. For such a major lifetime expense, it is
    imperative that we do better.

    I’ll suggest an
    alternative approach in my next post. First,
    though, I want to focus on the nature of the problem we need to solve.

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