Category: Bankruptcy Generally

  • Commissions, Specialized Courts, and Business Law

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    At the end of a forthcoming Columbia Law Review article, Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani propose that Congress establish a National Corporate Law Commission to comprehensively review corporate law and — not surprisingly given their prior work — determine which aspects should be federalized.  Bebchuk and Hamdani mention in a footnote (fn 184 to be exact) that their preferred model for the corporate commission is . . . the National Bankruptcy Review Commission

    Putting aside whether corporate law should be federalized, I’m wondering whether the bankruptcy commission is the right model.  For one thing, the bankruptcy commission had a limited existence (I remain hopeful that the provision in a recent Senate bill proposing to forcibly reconvene the bankruptcy commission will never become law).  But Bebchuk and Hamdani suggest in the article that they think a standing commission is preferable.  I’ll leave to the public choice scholars to discern the implications of the distinction here for purposes of turning commission recommendations into law.    In addition, the bankruptcy commission’s members were selected not only by Congress, as the authors indicate they desire for the corporate commission, but by the President and by the Chief Justice.  I suspect it was well understood that the late Chief Justice Rehnquist would choose federal judges for the bankruptcy commission (he chose one circuit judge and one bankruptcy judge). Given the underlying federalization mission that Bebchuk and Hamdani advocate for this commission, identifying the right judicial members of such a commission could be delicate. 

    In any event, Bebchuk and Hamdani would like the corporate commission to consider the creation of a specialized federal corporate law court (they don’t advocate for the specialized court but note its possibility as a response to those who like the idea of the Delaware Chancery Court).  Here’s another place where the bankruptcy experience might be useful.  Bankruptcy cases are part litigation, part transactional, part administrative.  Assuming a specialized federal forum is justified at all, it seems that this is a better reason than in-depth knowledge of a substantive legal field.   Notably, the recently-created "business courts" in states like Nevada are far broader in jurisdictional scope than the Delaware Chancery Court (admittedly, the new courts would probably go out of business quickly if their jurisdiction was limited to corporate disputes as traditionally defined).  Even the Delaware Chancery Court is getting a bit more generalist; the state of Delaware has given the court jurisdiction over money damage technology disputes and mediation-only business disputes.   All this being said, one federalization possibility — certainly controversial — would be to expand the bankruptcy court to include corporate and related matters.  Greater legal integration of shareholders and creditors would be a good development, and perhaps more exposure to the governance of financially healthy corporations would aid courts in presiding over the bankruptcy cases of insolvent corporations.      

  • Disclose, Disclose, Hide

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    All my professional life, I have heard that there are three rules of bankruptcy:  "disclose, disclose, disclose."  Worried about a conflict?  Disclose it. Want to make a payment? Disclose it.  Starting a new business initiative? Disclose it.  In fact, I thought disclosure was the quo for the quid of the automatic stay and other bankruptcy-induced protection.  Evidently I was misinformed.

    Gretchen Morgensen reported in the New York Times yesterday that Delaware bankruptcy judge Kevin Carey ruled that the Werner Company, a ladder maker, wouldn’t have to disclose the bonsues it was handing out to the executives as part of the reorganization plan.  The reason?  Such disclosure ""may create low morale and an unhealthy work environment." Just to drive home the point, the hearing itself was closed to the public.

    What can this mean except that the employees are asked to take a hit while the executives are taking home sacks of money?  And if keeping it a secret is supposed to help morale, then is it fair to assume that the amount of money the executives are keeping is more even than the rank-and-file employees could possibly imagine?

    So the new rule is "discose, disclose, and keep it a secret if the big boys want it that way"?  I just want to be sure that I have it right before I try to teach it to a new generation of students.

  • A Real Live Involuntary Bankruptcy

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    Involuntary bankruptcy petitions are a fascinating and a fundamental part of our bankruptcy system.  They are quite rare overall, although somewhat less so in the biggest chapter 11 cases, according to LoPucki and Whitford’s early research.   But the disappearance of a Chapel Hill lawyer has prompted the filing of an involuntary petition – – a media report here.   Pursuing a bankruptcy case against a missing person will be a challenge worth watching.

  • On Absurdity

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    A few days ago, I discussed the sloppy drafting in the 2005 bankruptcy amendments, focusing on one particular piece of drafting that could be construed to eliminate involuntary bankruptcy petitions. Tom Perkins made a good point in the comments. A venerated legal maxim holds that courts are to apply the plain meaning of a statute unless the results would be absurd, but "[c]ourts are now faced with having to define absurdity much more
    frequently in light of many of the curiously drafted or pasted together
    provisions of BAPCPA."

    In January, Judge Bruce Markell published a thoughtful opinion exploring what it means for a result to be absurd such that a court should not follow the literal words of the statute. Judge Markell was dealing with a part of the 2005 amendments related to homestead exemptions. He uses Justice Scalia’s legisprudential writings as a point of departure: "Justice Antonin Scalia is one of the strictest, if not the strictest, textualists active today. . . .  If the methods used by Justice
    Scalia would lead to the reformation of the statute, then the statute probably
    should be reformed, and little time need be spent in discerning the proper or
    ultimate test for all federal statutes." This opinion has been called the WWSD or "What Would Scalia Do" approach. The legal citation is In re Kane, 336 B.R. 477 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2006) and is well worth a read by anyone grappling with applying the 2005 bankruptcy amendments.

  • Floyd Norris Asks a Good Question

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    In today’s N.Y. Times ($), columnist Floyd Norris asks a good question. Were parts of the 2005 bankruptcy amendments meaningless? Specifically, Mr. Norris writes about a section of the new law that appears to put limits on retention bonuses for executives of bankrupt firms. Mr. Norris details the dispute between the reorganizing Dana Corporation and its creditors. Dana wants to pay its CEO a $3 million bonus for staying with the company until it emerges from bankruptcy.

    As the law that eventually emerged in 2005 wended its way through Congress in the early part of this decade, reports appeared about bankrupt corporations signing multimillion dollar contracts with corporate executives to ensure the executives stayed with the company through bankruptcy. If generals make the mistake of always fighting the last war, politicians make the mistake of always solving the last corporate crisis. Hence, the congressional solution was a new law banning payments to induce a corporate insider to remain with the bankrupt business. These payments are allowed only if the insider was essential to the business, the insider had a competing offer to go elsewhere, and the payment was no more than 10 times the amount paid to nonmanagement employees to induce them to stay with the company.

    To answer Mr. Norris’s question, this particular section is meaningless. The weakness lies in the way the section was drafted, a point I made yesterday about the 2005 law generally. The predicate for its application is that the payment has to be made for purposes of inducing the insider to stay with the business. It is a simple matter to structure a compensation package so the payment is made for other purposes. For example, a bonus payable upon confirmation of a chapter 11 plan or to meet certain performance goals is an incentive payments to meet those goals, not retention payments. I have yet to encounter an attorney doing chapter 11 work who thinks this new provision will have any substantial effect on compensation practices in chapter 11.

  • College Students’ Responses to their Parents’ Bankruptcies

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    Regardless of the class I’m teaching, I always find some way to incorporate the subjects of credit, debt and bankruptcy into my lectures. In Introduction to Sociology, I tie the subjects to discussions of social institutions; in Research Methods, I talk about the methods we use to collect data on the Consumer Bankruptcy Project (and share many of our findings); and in Social Inequality, well, the connection is pretty obvious.

    One consequence of these lectures on credit/debt/bankruptcy is that students feel free to come talk with me in the privacy of my office about their parents’ bankruptcies. Some cry because they are frightened that their parents will no longer be able to afford to pay for college, which translates into either more student loans or postponing their education. Some are afraid that their friends will find out the truth about why the family sold the house and moved out of the neighborhood. Others are angry at their parents’ (assumed) financial stupidity. And still others are relieved to know that their parents are not to blame–their mom’s medical bills or the loss of their dad’s job better explains what happened to the family.

    Granted, these observations are nothing more than anecdotal evidence, but they do suggest that when parents file for bankruptcy, the experience extends to their children. The kids are frightened, embarrassed and angry–all of the emotions that their folks probably felt. Unfortunately, these kids don’t feel that they can talk with their parents about the bankruptcy (we all know that people will talk about their sex lives long before they will chat about their finances). Instead, they turn to their professor for reassurance.

  • Cars in Bankruptcy

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    Last night around the dinner table, I was saying how my day involved pulling 32 bankruptcy court files. "Guess," I said, "what was the average age of the car in which the debtor was claiming an exemption?" As my children rolled their eyes at another boring dinner conversation, my wife said "six months," and a guest offered "one year."

    The answer is . . . .

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