Category: Financial Institutions

  • What Does It Take to Modify a MBS Servicing Agreement?

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    This evening I did a little sample of MBS indentures and pooling and servicing agreements (PSAs) to see what it takes to modify them. This is an important issue because it will determine the amount of MBS that the government would have to buy in a bailout to be able to get to the underlying loans in order to modify them and help financially distressed homeowners. I looked at 24 MBS deals (I used Alan White’s deal sample, but couldn’t find docs for two deals). By my read of the documents, doing any serious loan modification would require the government to hold a lot of MBS. Of the 24 deals, 21 or 87.5% required a 2/3 majority to modify the servicing agreement, while only 3 or 12.5% required a simple majority.

    Many PSAs, however, further provide that any amendment that would “reduce in any manner the amount of, or delay the timing of, payment received on Mortgage Loans which are required to be distributed on any certificate..” may not be done without the consent of the certificate holder. Widescale modifications and loan restructurings would inevitably reduce the amount of payment to be distributed or delay the timing of the payments. If the pool is overcollateralized or there is a first loss position willing to absorb these losses, then 100% shouldn’t be necessary, but if widescale modifications are necessary, 100% agreement of MBS holders will be necessary.

    This means it will be difficult, if not impossible, for the government to gather up enough MBS to get to the underlying mortgages. Not everyone holding MBS will sell to the government or even be eligible to participate in the bailout. And there are second mortgages that are in separate pools. It will also take time to process and to sort, time during which the foreclosure machine will keep rolling along. This is Humpty-Dumpty, and all of Paulson’s horses and all of Bernanke’s men will have a lot of trouble putting these pools back together again.

    What this means is that it will be entirely arbitrary which homeowners the government will be able to assist in the end. It will have nothing to do with the merits of a homeowner’s case or the homeowner’s willingness to incur a cost. It will be entirely a function of which financial institutions work with the government and who happens to hold what MBS paper. This is another why bankruptcy modification is necessary–it is the only fair solution that is available to all homeowners, not a lucky, random few.

  • The Bailout: Terms of the Debate

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    A quick couple of observations about the bailout debate:

    1. No one is arguing about the method of doing the bailout. The idea of a individualized institution-by-institution bailout seems to be the only idea getting any traction even though it has huge transaction costs and lots of possibilities of conflicts of interest and self-dealing by financial institutions working as agents for the Treasury (see my wholesale bailout proposal through a series of public reverse Dutch auctions here).

    2. There isn’t a lot of debate about the amount of the bailout. There’s been some suggestion that it could cost much more (or less). But no one is proposing only doing a $500BN bailout or a $300BN bailout. Shouldn’t we be asking how Treasury got a $700BN figure? I’d like to see their math.

    3. Treasury’s proposed bailout was the equivalent of asking for a no-covenant loan. I know Paulson’s been off the Street for a bit, but perhaps someone should tell him that no one is doing no-covenant or even covenant-lite loans anymore.

    4. The Treasury proposal, nicknamed “Authorization to Use Financial Force,” seems to be an attempt to put the Powell doctrine of overwhelming force into play in the financial world. But are we sure that it works? Lots of cash poorly deployed doesn’t result in victory. If we want to stay with the Iraq war analogy, it might be easy enough to stabilize the market temporarily/topple Saddam’s regime, but it scares me that Treasury/Fed seems to have no long-term plan, just as with Iraq. If we’re going to go to war, we better be prepared to win the peace.

  • The Bailout — another perspective (part 2)

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    In my prior post I talked about why the bailout was probably the best, if still unattractive, solution to the current mess, while noting that the Fed and administration have done a pretty lousy job of explaining what is at stake.  In this post I take up the regulatory issues that naturally flow from the present crisis, particularly the issue of credit default swaps, which I’ve been following for a while.

    During the hearings earlier today, Senator Dodd called the current crisis “entirely foreseeable and preventable, not an act of God."  He is right.

    The crisis is complex, but there seems to be general agreement that the root problem was a deadly co-dependence between irresponsible borrows and irresponsible lenders.  While I leave the problem of the borrowers to my colleagues that study them, I will state at the outset that if this bailout is our national moment for "moving on," it seems reasonable that that this should apply to the borrows and lenders equally.  In short, I don’t buy Secretary Paulson’s suggestion that this is "unlreated."

    Turning to the lenders, the part of the problem that is within my jurisdiction, I agree with Christopher Cox, the chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission,who today called for more regulation of the credit derivatives markets.  While I was willing to give this new market some space while it developed, it is clear that the atomistic nature of the market is at odds with the larger economic good.

    Stated bluntly, the industry had its chance and blew it.  Time to consider something new.  More after the jump.

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  • Mortgage Modification in Bankruptcy: Redux

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    The Dodd and Frank bailout proposals have both put the possibility of modifying mortgages in bankruptcy back on the table. To some Credit Slips readers, this is old hat (see below for links to our past posts). But I want to provide a quick primer for those who are not well-versed in the issue.

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  • The Bailout — another perspective (part 1)

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    First, I want to thank Bob Lawless and the rest of the Credit Slips folks for having me back yet again — I’m getting to be like the guest who would not leave.

    Second, while it might make me part of the "establishment," I’m going to say right from that start that I join those who favor the bailout.

    I also think we need to avoid a whole lot of knee jerk reactions that
    are floating around out there — like the SEC’s ban on short selling, which
    is quickly becoming the Bad Management Protection Act of 2008.  Of course, the notion that the administration can open the door on this issue "just a little" is also equally suspect.

    I view the economy and the larger financial system as being at a Titanic like moment:  post iceberg, per submersion.  It is certainly reasonable to disdain those who got us into this situation, but I’m not going to let my feelings for them get in the way of saving as many people as possible.

    That said, I understand why there is a good deal of skepticism about the bailout.  In part chapter 11 is to blame — there has been almost no effort to explain why AIG is different from Enron, United Airlines, or any other really big corporation that has recently failed.  And the financial industry needs to fess up that it blew its chance to self-regulate the credit default swap market — too many people, even myself to some degree, bought the "trust us, we’re experts" line from ISDA and other market players.

    No wonder people aren’t buying that line in connection with the bailout — especially when the administration has its own credibility problems in this regard in connection with other big, complex projects in the non-financial area.

    More on the chapter 11 issue, and why I think the administration has done a terrible job of selling this but still generally support the bailout, after the jump.  I’ll save my thoughts on the CDS market for another post.

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  • “My Country Has Had Crisis…”

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    If you’re like me and seek solace in satire when things go bad, this parody from a blog on The Nation‘s web site hits the note with perfect pitch. I won’t spell out the whole thing here, but it begins,

    "Dear American:

    I need to ask you to support an urgent secret business relationship with a transfer of funds of great magnitude.

    I am Ministry of the Treasury of the Republic of America. My country has had crisis that has caused the need for large transfer of funds of 800 billion dollars US. If you would assist me in this transfer, it would be most profitable to you."

    The later statement that "this transactin is 100% safe" seems oddly prescient.

  • The Right and the Left of It

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    As debate on the bailout continued today, a funny thing happened on the New York Times‘ op-ed page. William Kristol, the Times’ current token-ultraconservative columnist, and Paul Krugman, who might just be the most-read liberal economist in the country, agreed. They agreed that the bailout proposed by Paulson is a terrible one. Even more, they agreed for many of the same reasons, the main issue being Bob Lawless’ point that the plan provides for just about no oversight of its implementation.

    My views being what they are, I found Krugman’s to be a must-read analysis of the current crisis. He breaks down what went wrong in a simple but not overly simplistic fashion and pinpoints exactly where intervention is needed.

    Quick update: A few minutes ago,  Krugman registered more positive opinion of Senator Dodd’s alternative proposal.

  • A Modest Bailout Proposal

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    There are two ways to do a bailout: wholesale and retail. The current proposals all look like retail-level proposals–individually negotiated deals with separate institutions. This sort of bailout, however, is (1) high on transaction costs and (2) vulnerable to favoritism (will Goldman be the first institution served?).

    We might do better with a wholesale bailout: have the Treasury essentially do a tender offer through a reverse Dutch auction, with a maximum offer price (say 75%). A two-week only offer for all MBS paper that was rated AAA a year ago, starting at say 15 cents on the dollar. Then inch the price offer upward until either (1) the whole pool of funds is gone or (2) the two-week window is closed. Then move on to AA paper, and so forth, until the funds are exhausted or all the paper has been sold. Anyone who doesn’t sell in this time window…no bailout for you!

    There are lots of ways in which one could fine-tune such a wholesale proposal. The idea of starting with the top grade paper and inching downwards is to try to shield against adverse selection (time window helps too with risk-averse firms and directors scared about litigation). One can of course futz with the price–it could easily include an equity stake, ala the Dodd proposal.

    This process would have several advantages over a piecemeal individualized bailout:

    (1) completely transparent and no room for favoritism. The auctions would be easy to monitor, and there would be no room for obfuscation through small print in reports issued to Congress;

    (2) low transaction costs–very few commissions paid to the financial services industry. Those savings will offset adverse selection issues;

    (3) no self-dealing concerns from using financial institutions as agents;

    (4) much, much faster, bringing stability to the market sooner–it doesn’t do Treasury any good to get $700BN if it takes them a year to spend it;

    (5) indeterminate whether or not more expensive for Treasury. If one believes in the market mechanism and has concerns about whether Treasury (or its self-interested agents, who will surely be paid cash commissions, rather than having a stake in the deal’s outcome for Treasury) can properly value MBS, this is at least as good of a way to do it.

    fwiw, we’ve done wholesale bailouts before–just think of the Gold clause abrogation. A wholesale bailout would be quick and dirty, but likely not any dirtier (and quite possibly a whole lot cleaner) than a retail bailout.

  • The Dodd Bailout Proposal

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    Senator Christopher Dodd is apparently circulating an alternative bailout proposal to the Treasury’s. I haven’t found a link to the draft legislation, but purportedly it A link to the bill can be found here. It would require financial institutions to give up $1 in equity for every $1 in Treasury funds they take to ship off MBS. In other words, the price for the bailout will be dilution of shareholders (which will function as an economic penalty on many employees and especially executives of the financial institutions). The Dodd proposal would also create a much needed oversight mechanism and would allow qualified homeowners to modify mortgages in bankruptcy. (A separate blog about that later, perhaps).

    We’ve already established that the cost of a federal bailout is dilution (Fannie/Freddie, AIG), so dilution shouldn’t raise a lot of eyebrows at this point. Having not seen the full proposal, it’s hard to say a lot, but if that is the only difference from the Treasury’s plan, that is a huge improvement. It imposes a real price on institutions that want government assistance, and that price is commensurate with the scope of the assistance in dollar amounts, although not necessarily in value to the institution. Personally, I think a $1/$1 across the board dilution could be strengthened–why not $2 of stock for every $1 of Treasury funds for more hard pressed institutions, and something like $5 to $1 for the most troubled ones. These are the institutions, after all, that are most in need of equity capital.

    The oversight mechanism in the Dodd proposal strikes me as rather weak, but compared to the Treasury proposal, it is the very model of a modern inspector general.
    Now that I’ve seen the oversight details of the Dodd bill, they look reasonable at first glance.

    Here’s a link to a House version of the (not yet introduced?) bill.

  • Thoughts on the Bailout Plan

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    [Revised 9.21.08 at 1:40 pm9.20.08 at 4:15pm]

    The Treasury’s bailout plan is out. There’s really not much to it: under the plan, the Treasury would be authorized to purchase up to $700 billion in mortgage-related assets from US headquartered financial institutions. To put it in even simpler terms, Paulson has asked for a $700BN mortgage slush fund, no strings attached. Given where we are, this might be about the only thing possible. But there are still lots of questions raised by the Treasury’s very terse proposal. Not least of them are:

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