Category: Sociological Perspectives

  • The Myth of Optimal Expectation Damages

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    Roughly eighty years ago, Lon Fuller and William Perdue (the former, then a faculty member at Duke Law, and the latter, a 3L), wrote two of the most famous articles in contract law (here). One of the puzzles they posed — about why the law favors the expectation damages measure — resulted in an entire body of scholarship, including the theory of efficient breach. And although there are a number of superb articles that have been written on this matter (Craswell, Scott, Goetz, Triantis, Posner, Klass and more), I confess that I have always had a strong distaste for this body of optimal damages scholarship because it was too complicated for me. I have, however, been most grateful to Fuller and Perdue because, in the wake of their famous collaboration, they set up a scholarship at Duke to fund faculty-student research collaborations that I have frequently applied for funding to. Last summer, I finally had to pay the price though, because three of my Duke students (one former and two current) asked if we could work on a legal realist examination of the Fuller-Perdue optimal damages question itself. I was resistant, but Jamie Boyle (who has written a fabulous piece linking Fuller's work in both public and private law (here)), urged that the students were right about this being a fun project. 

    Jamie and the students were right about this being a fun project, in spades (we owe a special debt to Mark Weidemaier, who is a saint in terms of his generosity with comments and advice). All credit to Theresa, Amanda and Madison (errors are mine).

    With thanks to Lon Fuller and William Perdue, the paper is here, and the abstract is below:

    One of the most debated questions in the literature on contract law is what the optimal measure of damages for breach should be.  The standard casebook answer, drawing from the theory of efficient breach, is expectations damages.  This standard answer, once considered a major contribution of the law and economics field, has increasingly come under attack by theoreticians within that field itself. To shed an empirical perspective on the question, we look at data in one setting (prepayment clauses in international debt contracts) on what types of damages provisions parties contract for themselves. We find little evidence of a preference for the expectations damages measure.

  • Consumer Bankruptcy, Done Correctly, To Help Struggling Americans

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    Today, Senator Elizabeth Warren unveiled her new plan to reform the consumer bankruptcy system. The plan is simple, yet elegant. It is based on actual data and research (including some of my own with Consumer Bankruptcy Project co-investigators Slipster Bob Lawless, former Slipster, now Congresswoman Katie Porter, and former Slipster Debb Thorne). Most importantly, I believe it will make the consumer bankruptcy system work for American families. And, as a bonus, it will tackle the bad behavior that big banks and corporations currently engage in once people file, like trying to collect already discharged debts, and some non-bankruptcy financial issues, such as "zombie" mortgages.

    In short, the plan provides for one chapter that everyone files, combined with a menu of options to respond to each families' particular needs. It undoes some of the most detrimental amendments that came with the 2005 bankruptcy law, including the means test. In doing so, it sets new, undoubtedly more effective rules for the discharge of student loan debt, for modification of home mortgages, and for keeping cars. It also undoes "smaller" amendments that likely went unnoticed, but may have deleterious effects on people's lives. Warren's plan gets rid of the current prohibition on continuing to pay union dues, the payment of which may be critical to allowing people who file bankruptcy to keep their jobs and keep on their feet. Similarly, the plan eliminates problems debtors face paying rent during their bankruptcy cases, which can lead to eviction.

    One chapter that everyone files means that the continued racial disparities in chapter choice my co-authors and I have documented will disappear. No means test, combined with less documentation, as provided by Warren's plan, means that the most time-consuming attorney tasks will go away. Attorney's fees should decrease. Warren's plan also provides for the payment of fees over time. People will not have to put off filing for bankruptcy for years while they struggle in the "sweatbox." Costly "no money down" bankruptcy options should disappear. People will have the chance to enter the bankruptcy system in time to save what little they have, which research has shown is key to people surviving and thriving post-bankruptcy.

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  • Bankruptcy and Mindfulness

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    The practice of mindfulness and other types of meditation are growing on the coasts and within the law school and lawyer communities. Perhaps these practices can provide meaningful benefits to bankruptcy clients, bankruptcy lawyers and bankruptcy professors and judges. The essence of "mindfulness for lawyers" efforts begins with the notion that the adversary system can take a toll on home life, friendships and our own notions of who we want to be. A meditation practice can help us concentrate and be the best lawyers we can be and also the best friends and family members we want to be; and perhaps even help us to be the kind of persons we want to be. It is a mix of focusing more fully on the present, mixing that with lovingkindness to ourselves and others, and observing what is going on in our minds, all without judgment.

    Consumer bankruptcy debtors, creditors, practitioners and judges are constantly faced with problems for which the legal system is at best a partial solution. In most cases there are a few true winners and a host of partial winners, partial losers and complete losers. Mindfulness can help us keep a focus on the matter in front of us and also help us maintain our passion for life and practice.  On the business bankruptcy side, our duty of loyalty combined with the zealous representation ethic can allow the day-to-day fighting to change our character and perhaps even our values. In every community there are a host of ways of starting such a practice.  The book 10% Happier by Dan Harris is an easy entry point and in most communities there is a Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction course available.  More and more law schools and bar associations are providing such opportunities. Mindfulnessinlawsociety.com and themindfullawstudent.com are excellent resources.  I am enjoying teaching mindfulness to law students as well as faculty and staff at Saint Louis University Law School. 

     

     

  • Supreme Court Grants Cert To Decide Fate of Repossessed Cars in Bankruptcy

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    Yesterday, the SCOTUS granted certiorari in City of Chicago v. Fulton, 19-357, to resolve a circuit split about whether a creditor's inaction in not returning property repossessed pre-petition can violate the automatic stay. The split arises predominately from chapter 13 cases in which, pre-petition, creditors repossessed or cities impounded debtors' cars. As the petition for cert stated, this issue is of significant practical importance. As Slipster Bob Lawless, former Slipster Debb Thorne, and I set forth in our new paper based on Consumer Bankruptcy Project data, Driven to Bankruptcy (Wake Forest Law Review, forthcoming 2020), bankruptcy courts deal with more than a million cars in every year. Creditors will have repossessed, but not disposed of some of those cars, and cities (for instance, Chicago) and municipalities will have impounded some of those cars.

    In our new paper, we note that bankruptcy seems to be an important tool for some people to keep their cars, including getting their cars back from creditors and impound yards. As will be decided by the Supreme Court in addressing the issues regarding the automatic stay raised by the circuit split, if debtors need to request that bankruptcy courts order creditors or cities to return their cars after they file bankruptcy, the usefulness of filing bankruptcy will decrease, potentially significantly. Stated differently, people need their cars now — to get to work, to get food, to get their kids to daycare, to get to the doctor. For some households, one of the biggest benefits of filing bankruptcy seems to be that their creditors must turn over repossessed and impounded cars as soon as the debtor files . The question now is — is that actually what the Code provides? 

  • What a Local Traffic Snafu Teaches About Artificial Intelligence in Underwriting

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    The DC suburbs are a case study in NIMBYism. Lots of communities try to limit through-traffic via all sorts of means:  speed bumps, one-way streets, speed cameras, red-light cameras, etc.  The interaction of one of these NIMBYist devices with GPS systems is a great lesson about the perils of artificial intelligence and machine learning in all sorts of contexts.  Bear with the local details because I think there's a really valuable lesson here.

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  • Matt Levine, Insider Trading and Mr. Potato Chip

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    Matt Levine is my favorite financial journalist to read on a regular basis because he is so darn funny (yes, there is lots of substance too, but I'm shallow and want to be entertained). Today's piece though, especially to someone who used to teach the law on insider trading, was priceless.

    I want to cut and paste the entire piece here, because it made me smile and laugh out loud at the same time.  But I worry that Bloomberg might get annoyed and chase after me for stealing their content.  The link is here — hope you find it as funny I did.

     

  • Anderson and Nyarko’s Cool New Papers on Contract Evolution

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    Two of the contracts papers I’ve been most looking forward to this fall have just been posted on ssrn. They are are Rob Anderson’s “An Evolutionary Perspective on Contracting: Evidence From Poison Pills” (here) and Julian Nyarko’s “Stickiness and Incomplete Contracts” (here).

    Both papers aim at deepening our understanding of how contracts evolve and, in particular, why they evolve in ways so very different from the standard model used in law schools where parties are assumed to negotiate for an optimal set of terms for their relationships.

    One would predict a very different set of contract terms for parties if one takes the contract production process seriously and thinks of contract provisions as products (ala Barak Richman, here) or product attributes (ala Doug Baird, here).  Specifically, Rob and Julian both use models of contract production where new contracts are constructed by building on pre-existing templates.

    In this world, one should expect a high degree of path dependence in the data.  And that is precisely what Rob and Julian demonstrate, looking at two very different areas of commercial contracting – poison pill and choice-of-forum provisions. The implications of their papers, both of which are studying the most sophisticated and well-heeled of all contracting parties, for the one of the core exercises in contract law – how should judges interpret contracts – are considerable.  That said – and this is not meant to take away from the two papers at all — these papers are more about empirically documenting and understanding the phenomena than normative questions of what judges should be doing.

    There is an enormous amount of new material in both papers and I will not do more than scratch the surface in terms of their respective contributions.  Here, however, are a couple of things about each of the papers that stood out to me.

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  • My Favorite Contract Metaphors: Skeuomorphs, Sea Squirts, Barnacles and Black Holes

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    I love contract metaphors. I’m especially fond of metaphors for the phenomenon of antiquated and useless contract provisions that find a way to persist over the decades in boilerplate contracts.  Philip Wood, the legendary English lawyer, uses the metaphor of barnacles on a ship’s hull to describe how more and more of these useless provisions can accumulate over the years, eventually severely impacting the efficiency of the ship. If you like boats and hate barnacles (perhaps because one of your most hated chores in the summers was for you to attempt to scrape barnacles off the hull of your uncle’s fishing boat), this metaphor may work especially well for you (sorry, Uncle Marvin). Another favorite of mine, that does not bring up memories of unpleasant chores, is Doug Baird’s skeuomorph.  To quote Douglas, who in the course of his explaining why we should not be surprised that suboptimal contract terms both emerge and then persist, has some wonderful examples:

    To take a[n] . . .  example, maple syrup is often sold in a glass bottle with a small handle that serves no discernable utilitarian purpose. This is a relic of the time when maple syrup came in jugs and the handles were large enough to be useful. This phenomenon—of a product feature persisting when incorporated in a new environment in which it no longer serves a function—is well known and has a name: skeuomorph.

    Douglas goes on to explain that these skeuomorphs can bizarrely become desired features of the product in question (and remember he is drawing an analogy to contract drafting). He writes, while continuing with the maple syrup bottle example:

    Buyers of maple syrup want to see a small handle on the bottle. It serves no purpose, but it is what consumers have come to expect. Blue jeans are no longer made for working men who carry pocket watches, but buyers of blue jeans want a watch pocket all the same, even though they have no idea of the purpose it serves and have no use for it. Everyone expects Worcestershire Sauce bottles to come wrapped in paper even though the reason for doing this has long disappeared. Tagines took a particular shape for functional reasons when they were made of clay, and they retained this shape when made of aluminum even though there was no longer a functional reason for doing so. Skeuomorphs can be found everywhere on the “desktops” of personal computers

    In short, the idea that a clause could be added to a contract and remain there merely because everyone expected it to be there suggests nothing special about either pari passu clauses in particular or contract terms more generally. The same forces are at work as with ordinary product attributes. Crafting legal prose is hard, and few contracts are ever written from scratch. Lawyers almost always start with a template taken from someplace else. For this reason, those who draft contracts are likely to import features from earlier contracting environments, even when they serve no purpose, merely because they are familiar. To give another example involving financial instruments, the first railway bonds were based on real estate mortgages. They still bear some of the attributes of real estate mortgages, and not always for the better.

    If you like this topic, I recommend Douglas’ piece “Pari Passu Clauses and the Skeuomorph Problem in Contract Law” (you should of course ignore all the bits of this brilliant piece that are critical of my paper with Bob Scott and Steve Choi on Contractual Black Holes (yes, another metaphor I’m very fond of) that Douglas’ piece was a comment on).

    Last but not least is the Sea Squirt, a close cousin of the barnacle.  This one comes from M&A guru, Glenn West who was speaking on a panel at UT in 2018 on M&A Contracting.  The title of his presentation was: “Have Sea Squirts Invaded Your Contract?—Avoiding Mindless Use of So Called ‘Market’ Terms You May or May Not Understand”.  Below I’ve excerpted some priceless language from an August 2017 blog post by Glenn on MAC clauses in M&A agreements.  And yes, Glenn is talking about M&A contracts containing brainless bits of language; the contracts drafted by the most elite among all transactional lawyers.

    As an aside, there are a number of excellent recent papers arguing over how brainless M&A contracts are; see here (Anderson & Manns) and here (Coates, Palia & Wu).

    From Glenn’s blog post, here goes:

    The sea squirt is an animal that begins life with a brain and a tail.  Immediately after it is born, it uses its brain and tail to propel itself through the water until it finds some rockto attach itself.  Once it attaches itself to that rock it consumes its brain, absorbs its tail, and thereafter never moves again; it lives out its remaining life as a brainless water filter.

    Many of the standard terms of M&A agreements also began their existence with a brain—the brain of a smart lawyer who perceived an issue that needed to be addressed and drafted a clause to address it.  And then other smart lawyers recognized the value of that newly drafted clause, and adapted and improved it until it became a standard part of most M&A agreements.  But once that clause became attached to the “market” it became divorced from the brain or brains that created it, and soon everyone was using it regardless of whether they truly understood all the reasons that prompted its draftingEven worse, market attachment is so strong that even after a standard clause has been repeatedly interpreted by courts to have a meaning that differs from the meaning ascribed to that clause by those who purport to know but do not actual know its meaning (mindlessly using the now brainless clause), it continues to be used without modification.  Such is the case for many with the ubiquitous Material Adverse Change (“MAC”) or Material Adverse Effect (“MAE”) clause.

    My friend at UNC Chapel Hill, John Coyle, has an article coming out soon on “Contract as Swag”.  I’m eager to see how that metaphor will work. I like swag and I want learn how to get more of it.

  • Coyle on Studying the History of a Contract Provision

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    The way many of us teach interpretation in Contract Law, there is little role for history (admittedly, this is just based on casual observation). The meaning of a clause is a function of the words that make up that clause.  The parties to the transaction are assumed to have drafted it to document the key aspects of their transaction, to balance risks and rewards blah blah.  If a dispute arises, we might have an argument as to whether a strict textualist reading of the words accurately represent what the parties really meant by them or whether we need to also examine the context of the relationship. What we do not ever do, however, is to delve into the history of the clause from before these parties contemplated using it – that is, of what prior drafters of the original versions of this clause might have meant in using it.

    The foregoing makes sense in a world in which the contracts for each deal are drafted from scratch. But does anyone draft contracts from scratch?  What if we live in a world where 99.9% of contracts are made up of provisions cut and paste from prior deals; provisions that are assumed to cover all the key contingencies, but not necessarily understood (or even read)? In this latter world, where there are lots of provisions that the parties to the transaction never fully focused on (let alone understood), might there be an argument – in cases where there are interpretive disputes — for the use of a contract provision’s history? Might that history not sometimes be more relevant than the non-understandings of the parties as to what they did or did not understand they were contracting for? (Among the few pieces that wrestle with this question are these two gems: Lee Buchheit's Contract Paleontology here and Mark Weidemaier's Indiana Jones: Contract Originalist here)

    I’m not sure what the answer to the foregoing question is. But it intrigues me.  And it connects to a wonderfully fresh new body of research in Contract Law where a number of scholars have been studying the production process for modern contracts.  The list of papers and scholars here is too long to do justice to and I’ll just end up making mistakes if I try to do a list.  But what unites this group of contract scholars is that for them it isn’t enough to assume that contracts show up fully formed at the time of a deal, purely the product of the brilliant minds of the deal makers who anticipate nearly every possible contingency at the start.  Instead, understanding what provisions show up in a contract, and in what formulation, requires understanding the contract production process. (Barak Richman's delightful "Contracts Meet Henry Ford" (here) is, to my mind, foundational).

    It is perhaps too early to tell whether this research will catch on and revolutionize contract law. I hope it does, but I’m biased.

    One of my favorite papers in this new body of contract scholarship showed up recently on ssrn. It is John Coyle’s “A History of the Choice-of-Law Clause” (here). I have rarely found a piece of legal scholarship so compelling.  The paper is not only a model of clarity in terms of the writing, but it is brave. It is completely unapologetic in not only taking on an entirely new mode of research (a painstaking documentation of the historical evolution of the most important terms in any and every contract), but in coming up with a cool and innovative research technique for unpacking that history (this project would have been impossible to do without that innovation).

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  • Ramming Bow Contracts

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    Have you heard of Ramming Bows? Or did you know that they describe a category of boilerplate contract provisions?  Until a couple of weeks ago, I had not either.  That was when I came across Glenn West’s two delightful blog posts at the Weil Gotshal & Manges site (here and here). Glenn is a senior partner in the Private Equity/M&A practice at Weil. And in his spare time, he writes wonderfully witty blog posts and articles about wide range of legal issues; many of which are about the bizarre world of sophisticated boilerplate contracting.  Even if you have no interest in contract law, let alone boilerplate contracts, I suspect that you will enjoy his writing.  It is insightful about the way in which contracts get produced and evolve in the real world and, even better, is funny.

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