Category: Underbanked/Fringe Banking

  • It’s All Debt to Me

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    It’s All Debt to Me, by Professor Kate Elengold, is a newly available article sure to be of interest to many Credit Slips readers. Check out the abstract and read the paper by clicking on this link, but in the meantime, an observation from the article’s conclusion, coupled with the article’s graphic of a set of triangles, frames what to expect:

    This Article has identified, explained, and explored the way that varied laws and doctrine come together to create the “law of individual debt.” In so doing, it has offered both scaffolding and mapping to understand, holistically, how the law treats debtors and creditors across two axes: public/private and voluntary/involuntary. It asks and answers the question: why are four-similarly situated debtors, each carrying $15,000 of debt that they cannot repay, treated so differently under the law?

  • The Consumer Debt Default Judgments Act

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    MapConsumer debt has been a difficult topic for uniform state law movements, but here's one more attempt recently approved by the Uniform Law Commission and the American Bar Association, and introduced in Colorado last week.  You can access the materials here. Meanwhile, here is ULC's summary:

    Numerous studies report that default judgments are entered in more than half of all debt collection actions. The purpose of this Act is to provide consumer debtors and courts with the information necessary to evaluate debt collection actions. The Act provides consumer debtors with access to information needed to understand claims being asserted against them and identify available defenses; advises consumers of the adverse effects of failing to raise defenses or seek the voluntary settlement of claims; and makes consumers aware of assistance that may be available from legal aid organizations. The Act also seeks to provide a uniform framework in which courts can fairly, efficiently, and promptly evaluate the merits of requests for default judgments while balancing the interests of all parties and the courts.

    Would welcome Credit Slips posters and readers chiming in on this act in the comments, especially if you were involved in the drafting process and/or if will be weighing in on this act with their state legislatures.

    And for previous recent coverage of other uniform acts being urged on state legislatures, see here and here.

  • Impact of the Illinois Predatory Loan Prevention Act

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    In 2021 Illinois passed its Predatory Loan Prevention Act (PLPA), which imposes a 36% military APR (MAPR) cap on all loans made by non-bank or credit union or insurance company lenders. Not surprisingly, the law has not been popular with higher cost lenders who either have to change their offerings, cease doing business in Illinois, or figure out some way to team up with a bank that won't run afoul of the law's anti-evasion provision. 

    Recently, opponents of the PLPA have been making some noise, pointing to a study by a trio of economists—J. Brandon Bollen, Gregory Elliehausen, and Thomas Miller—about the impact of the PLPA. (The latter two are familiar scholars whose work consistently takes a dour view of consumer finance regulations: readers might recall my debunking of another recent study by Professor Miller, co-authored with Todd Zywicki, that was fundamentally flawed because of the miscalculation of loan caps in various states.)

    Using credit bureau data, the Bollen et al. paper finds that the PLPA resulted in a 30% decrease in the number of unsecured installment loans to Illinois subprime borrowers and a 37% increase in the average installment loan size to Illinois subprime borrowers, which they attribute to the difficulty in making smaller loans profitable at 36% MAPR. Additionally, based on a lender-administered survey of 699 online borrowers (not necessarily of installment loans), the Bolen paper also reports a decline in borrower financial well-being following passage of the PLPA. 

    Unfortunately, the Bollen paper suffers from serious data and methodological problems such that it does not tell us anything meaningful about the wisdom of the PLPA. Here's why. 

    (more…)

  • The Financial Inclusion Trilemma

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    I have a new draft article up on SSRN. It's called The Financial Inclusion Trilemma. The abstract is below. 

    The challenge of financial inclusion is among the most intractable policy problems in banking. Despite being the world’s wealthiest economy, many Americans are shut out of the financial system. Five percent of households lack a bank account, and an additional thirteen percent rely on expensive or predatory fringe financial services, such as check cashers or payday lenders.

    Financial inclusion presents a policy trilemma. It is possible to simultaneously achieve only two of three goals: widespread availability of services to low-income consumers; fair terms of service; and profitability of service. It is possible to provide fair and profitable services, but only to a small, cherry-picked population of low-income consumers. Conversely, it is possible to provide profitable service to a large population, but only on exploitative terms. Or it is possible to provide fair services to a large population, but not at a profit.

    The financial inclusion trilemma is not a market failure. Rather it is the result of the market working. The market result, however, does not accord with policy preferences. Rather than addressing that tension, American financial inclusion policy still leads with market-based solutions and soft government nudges and the vain hope that technology will somehow transform the fundamental economics of financial services for small balance deposit accounts and small dollar loans.

    This Article argues that it is time to recognize the policy failure in financial inclusion and give more serious consideration to a menu of stronger regulatory interventions: hard service mandates that impose cross-subsidization among consumers; taxpayer subsidies; and public provision of financial services. In particular, this Article argues for following the approach taken in Canada, the EU, and the UK, namely the adoption of a mandate for the provision of free or low-cost basic banking services to all qualified applicants, as the simplest solution to the problem of the unbanked. Addressing small-dollar credit, however, remains an intractable problem, largely beyond the scope of financial regulation.

  • Hawkins & Penner–Marketing Race and Credit in America

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    Past Credit Slips guest blogger, Jim Hawkins from the University of Houston, and his student, Tiffany Penner, alerted me to their recent publication in the Emory Law Journal entitled, "Advertising Injustices: Marketing Race and Credit in America." The paper takes an interesting approach to the issue of how consumer credit gets marketed in the United States. They visited fringe lending establishments as well as the web sites of these establishments and mainstream banks and looked at the persons used as models in their advertisements.

    Although I have some questions about the magnitude of the effects–questions that come from how different government agencies Latino or Hispanic heritage sometimes as an ethnicity and sometimes as a racial identity–the core finding of the paper seems right. The models used in the advertisements send a signal about whether the financial service is "for people like you." How those people differ between mainstream banks and fringe lenders will not surprise anyone who has paid even a bit of attention to the structural racism that defines our economy. Hawkins and Penner close the paper with some thoughts on how the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the Community Reinvestment Act might help fix the problems they identify.

    UPDATE (9/26): My apologies to Ms. Penner for misidentifying her in the original title to this post.

  • A Campaign to Opt-Out

    Following-up on my prior post, let’s talk more about what’s at stake in this little legislative kerfuffle in the Hawkeye state, as well as how consumer advocates should seize on this moment in a different way.  

    First, repealing this 521 provision in Iowa law is really all about whether states should have, to a large degree, the ability to control the interest rates charged on products and services that are offered to consumers by nonbank firms. 

    Many readers of this blog may already know this history backwards and forwards – but for those who don’t, here’s the backstory. In Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the National Bank Act as giving nationally-chartered banks the ability to charge the highest interest rate allowed in the state where the bank is located to borrowers located not only in that state, but also to borrowers located in any other state.  This means, for instance, that a national bank located in Iowa can not only charge the highest interest rate allowable in Iowa to anyone located in Iowa, but it can also charge that same rate to a borrower located in Oklahoma, Louisiana, or any other state.  Even if Louisiana, Oklahoma, or another state’s laws prohibit interest at such a rate, the loan is nevertheless free from being usurious. This concept is known as “interest rate exportation.”  

    After the 1978 decision in Marquette, there was a concern about the ability of state-chartered banks to compete with national banks. So, state legislatures started enacting “parity laws” that allowed their state banks to charge the maximum rates of interest allowable by any national bank “doing business” in that particular state. These parity laws were often even broader, granting to state chartered banks all of the incidental powers granted to national banks. In sum, the goal of these parity laws was to put state banks on equal footing with national banks, particularly when it came to usury.  Good so far?

    Ok here comes the part dealing with this shady Iowa house bill…

    In a final effort to give state-chartered banks a competitive edge, in 1980 Congress passed the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA).  A portion of DIDMCA, specifically section 521 (see where this is going…) granted interest rate exportation to any state-chartered bank that was federally insured (in other words, to all FDIC-insured state-chartered banks). 12 U.S.C. 1831d. This allowed a state-chartered bank to charge out-of-state borrowers the same interest rate allowable for in-state borrowers.  Thus, a state-chartered bank located in Iowa could charge an Oklahoma borrower the Iowa-allowable interest rate, even if that rate was higher than what would otherwise be legal under Oklahoma law. 

    But here’s the catch. In Section 525 of DIDMCA, Congress gave states the ability to opt-out of section 521 by enacting legislation stating the state did not want section 521 to apply. Only two jurisdictions opted out: Puerto Rico and…you guessed it…Iowa. In 1980, right after DIDMCA was passed, Iowa opted out per 1980 Iowa Acts, ch. 1156, sec. 32. To add one more bit of background, Iowa also did not enact any parity laws. In fact, a former general counsel to the Iowa Division of Banking stated in a 2002 interview that enacting such a law that delegated control over Iowa state banks to the feds would be seen as “a slap in the face” to the Iowa legislature. 

    So, there you have it. This little provision in an otherwise unrelated tax bill is to OPT INTO section 521 and thereby reverse the decision Iowa’s legislature made in 1980.

    Now you may say to yourself, why is this so bad? The bad part requires you know something about the rent-a-bank partnership model between certain state-chartered banks and a number of online “fintech” lenders. Since the 2008 financial crisis, a growing number of nonbank fintech firms that make loans over the internet have partnered with a handful of state-chartered banks (mostly chartered in Utah, Kentucky, and New Jersey) in order to make and market unsecured installment consumer loans. By and large the way the business model works is that although the loan application is submitted through the nonbank’s website or smartphone app, it is the partner bank that actually advances the funds. The marketing and underwriting process are both performed by the nonbank. Then, very shortly after, the bank sells the loan along with others (or some interest in those loans) to the nonbank fintech company or an affiliate. The fintech or another firm then sells the interest to a pre-arranged wholesale buyer or sponsors a securitization of a large pool of loans for sale as securities in the capital markets. 

    The bank’s role is merely passing, and it typically retains no material economic interest in the loans. However, so the argument goes, because the loan is originated by an insured state-chartered bank, it can export the interest rate of its home state to borrowers located in ANY state (with state usury laws preempted by DIDMCA section 521). And sometimes these loans can be quite expensive (rates of 160% APR or more e.g., CashNet USA, Speedy Cash, Rapid Cash, Check n' Go, Check Into Cash). You can get more info on these partnerships and check out some nifty maps provided by the folks at the National Consumer Law Center here. 

    So, here’s how I think consumer advocates can turn the tables. There are a number of states that have aggressively gone after these rent-a-bank schemes (adding a lawsuit by AG of DC to the mix here) and a group of state AGs are currently suing the OCC on account of its true lender rule. In other words, a number of states do not want this kind of high cost, fintech-bank lending happening in their jurisdiction. 

    Here’s my suggestion to those states: why not just pass your own opt out of DIDMCA Section 521? 

    As mentioned above, many of these online lenders in high-cost rent-a-bank schemes favor partnering with FDIC-insured, state-chartered banks rather than national banks. Opting out of DIDMCA would deprive these schemes of their regulatory arbitrage. Without the ability to import the interest rate law of another state into a given jurisdiction, it would force these online firms to apply for a lending license and otherwise abide by the jurisdiction’s usury limit. DIDMCA allowed states to opt out of Section 521, and the statute didn’t give a deadline to do it. So, here’s a call to states like Colorado and others who are going after these usury and regulatory evasive business models…take away the linchpin of the business model. Opt-out of section 521!

    And as for those of us back here in the Hawkeye state, here’s to hoping that the Iowa legislature doesn’t (pardon the Peloton pun) get so easily taken for a ride.

  • Of Usury, Preemption, and Fancy Stationary Bikes

    Greetings, Slipsters! I’m thrilled to be here guest blogging, and I thank the editors for having me. So with that, let me get started…

    Usury, preemption, and pandemic fitness are all colliding here in Iowa. 

    About two weeks ago, I was alerted to a single strike-through amendment buried in a tax bill currently being considered by the Iowa legislature. This simple little change that eliminates three numbers (“521”) would likely go unnoticed by most lawmakers (or, more realistically—all lawmakers). However, this little change could have a profound impact on Iowa’s ability to prevent high cost, predatory lending from spilling into its borders through website portals and smart phone apps. And, if you stay with me for this bit of guest blogging, you’ll never believe what’s supposedly (so I’m told) behind it all! 

    The bill is HSB 272. Most of the bill contains routine tax code clean-ups and modifications. Indeed, the bill itself is sponsored by the Iowa Department of Revenue. But, take a look at the relevant part of Section 5:

    1980 Iowa Acts, chapter 1156, section 32, is amended to read as follows: SEC. 32.  The general assembly of the state of Iowa hereby declares and states . . . that it does not want any of the provisions of any of the amendments contained in Public Law No. 96-221 (94 stat. 132), sections 521, 522 and 523 to apply with respect to loans made in this state . . .

    If you clicked on the link above and read the entirely of Section 5, you’d probably have to go through the text quite a few times before you’d see what’s being stricken out. The singular change is just the reference to section 521 of Public Law No. 96-221 (94 stat. 132). Otherwise, everything else in this existing statute stays the same. 

    So what’s this about? 

    The only clue as to what this stricken language actually deals with is the reference to “loans made in this state.” In truth, this single little strikethrough will allow FDIC-insured state-chartered banks located in other states to make loans under the usury laws of their home states to the residents of Iowa. This kind of lending usually comes in the way of partnerships between a handful of state-chartered banks and so-called “fintech” nonbank lenders making triple digit loans, hardly any different from payday financing. This partnership lending practice has also been the subject of recent lawsuits, including a summer 2020 settlement by the Colorado AG. If you’re interested in a deep dive on the rent-a-bank model and the unique legal and policy problems it creates, check out forthcoming articles here (by Adam Levitin) and here (by me!).

    The icing on the cake, however, is that the rationale (again, as I’ve been told) advanced by proponents of the bill is that without this amendment, Iowans will not be able to finance the purchase of Pelotons. That’s right. Pelotons!

    Here’s the connection: Peloton currently partners with Affirm, a fintech online lender, in order to help consumers finance the purchase of these roughly $3,000 stationary bikes (bike + membership). Interestingly, both firms generally promote 0% down, 0% APR, 0% hidden fees in their financing package. Of course, if you scroll down to the bottom of the promotional website and read the tiny 10.5 point, gray font print, you’ll notice: 

    Your rate will be 0–30% APR based on credit, and is subject to an eligibility check. Options depend on your purchase amount, and a down payment may be required. Affirm savings accounts are held with Cross River Bank, Member FDIC. Savings account is limited to six ACH withdrawals per month. Affirm Plus financing is provided by Celtic Bank, Member FDIC. Affirm, Inc., NMLS ID 1883087. Affirm Loan Services, LLC, NMLS ID 1479506. California residents: Affirm Loan Services, LLC is licensed by the Department of Financial Protection and Innovation. Loans are made or arranged pursuant to California Financing Law license 60DBO-111681 (emphasis added).

    As you can see, Affirm also plays the rent-a-bank game by partnering with FDIC-insured Utah state bank, Celtic Bank. While 30% APR may not seem like the most expensive loan term in the world, it opens the door to much higher cost lending by firms like Elevate Credit, Opportunity Financial, and more–all of whom use the rent-a-bank model. 

    This is about much more than Pelotons…stay tuned for more (including how I think consumer advocates can turn the tables on this strategy!).

    UPDATE: It appears that HSB 272 isn't going anywhere: no legislative movement since a canceled House subcommittee hearing on April 6. Meanwhile, a duplicate tax bill has been filed in the Senate, but it does not contain the DIDMCA opt-out (SSB 1268).

  • Commercial and Contract Law: Questions, Ideas, Jargon

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    In the Spring I am teaching a research and writing seminar called Advanced Commercial Law and Contracts. Credit Slips readers have been important resources for project ideas in the past, and I'd appreciate hearing what you have seen out in the world on which you wish there was more research, and/or what you think might make a great exploration for an enterprising student. This course is not centered on bankruptcy, but things that happen in bankruptcy unearth puzzles from commercial and contract law more generally, so examples from bankruptcy cases are indeed welcome. You can share ideas through the comments below, by email to me, or direct message on Twitter.

    Also, I am considering having the students build another wiki of jargon as I did a few years ago in another course. Please pass along your favorite (or least favorite) terms du jour in commercial finance and beyond.

    Thank you as always for your input, especially during such chaotic times.

  • Coronavirus Will Hasten the Shift To App-Based Banking and Lending. How Will That Affect People’s Pocketbooks?

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    Over at the Machine Lawyering blog — organized and edited by the Chinese University of Hong Kong's Law Faculty’s Centre for Financial Regulation and Economic Development — Slipster Nathalie Martin and I just posted some commentary about our new article, Reducing The Wealth Gap Through Fintech "Advances" in Consumer Banking and Lending, forthcoming in the University of Illinois Law Review. The article, in part, assessing new "advances" in fintech products that promise to provide people with lower-cost banking and lending options. We focus on prepaid cards for wages, early wage access programs, and auto lending apps. We conclude that these products more likely than not will prove to be disadvantageous to consumers. The article's connection to the wealth gap is the recognition that high-cost banking and lending products impede people's ability to convert income into savings. We put forth a few ideas about the hallmarks of banking and lending products that actually may help close the wealth gap by targeting Americans’ unequal access to banking and lending services. 

    Nathalie and I, of course, wrote this article before the coronavirus pandemic. With stay-at-home orders and social distancing in effect, it is highly likely that people's already increasing use of online and app-based banking and lending products will increase even faster. If our analysis proves correct, the spoils of the increased shift will accrue more to providers than to consumers, and people may be able to save even less of their income. The pandemic has highlighted American's lack of savings. Hopefully helping Americans save will become more of a focus in the future.

    Also, on the note of early wage access programs, when we drafted the article, we found effectively no published analysis of early wage access programs. As we were writing, Nakita Cuttino and Jim Hawkins kindly shared their draft articles with us. Both articles are now available SSRN and present interesting (and different) analyzes of early wage access programs. Nakita's article is titled, The Rise of "FringeTech": Regulatory Risk in Early Wage Access. And Jim's article is titled, Earned Wage Access and the End of Payday Lending.

  • Corona Cash and Refund Anticipation Checks

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    Vijay Raghavan, who will be joining the Brooklyn Law School faculty this summer shared a troubling observation about the payment of the recovery rebates ("Corona Cash" or "Mnuchin Mnoney") through direct deposit to taxpayers. It seems that the payments for around 15% of individual tax filings might be going to bank accounts that are closed or not controlled by the taxpayers. That 15% is surely a much larger percentage of households eligible for Corona Cash. I wouldn't be surprised if close to a quarter of eligible households are affected.

    Raghavan writes:

    Recovery rebates (stimulus payments) under the CARES Act are supposed
    to go out this week. A number of people have noted that the payments
    will be delayed for unbanked consumers and the funds are at risk of
    being swept by lenders or debt collectors. What has received less
    attention is the fact that many banked or underbanked taxpayers may
    not receive their rebates because they financed tax preparation with a
    refund anticipation check (“RAC”). [AJL: a RAC is distinct from a refund anticipation loan, when the preparer advances the taxpayer part of the anticipated tax refund.]

    RACs allow taxpayers to defer the cost of tax preparation and finance
    preparation out of their refund. The refund is deposited in a
    temporary bank account that the tax preparer arranges to have opened.
    The taxpayer may never be made aware that the temporary account
    exists. The refund is then distributed to the taxpayer minus
    preparation fees and ancillary fees via check, direct deposit, or
    using some other payment instrument.

    The conventional wisdom is RACs are primarily used by unbanked
    consumers. But many banked or underbanked taxpayers may also use RACs.
    Smaller tax prep chains and individual tax prep stores rely on RAC
    financing for at least two reasons. First, the intermediaries these
    tax preparers use to process the returns charge numerous
    per-transaction fees, which are easier to pay for out of a taxpayer’s
    refund since the cash-strapped taxpayer can’t afford to pay for the
    intermediaries’ services up-front. Second, financing may serve to
    conceal inordinately high tax preparation fees. As a result, it is not
    uncommon to find tax preparation stores in low-income neighborhoods
    that refuse to accept up-front payment and only process RAC-financed
    returns. In the 2018 tax year, approximately 21 million returns were
    financed with RACs. [AJL: for context, there were around 150 million individual returns filed in 2018.]

    RACs present a few problems for stimulus distribution. If returns were
    already filed and processed, the temporary banks accounts may be
    closed, which will delay distribution of the rebate. If the temporary
    account is still open, the rebate may sit in the account without being
    distributed. There should be less problems if returns have not been
    filed or are still pending. But if refunds are initially distributed
    to the tax preparer as opposed to the taxpayer (which happens in some
    cases), there is some risk tax preparer may take the CARES Act money.

    The good news is large chains like H&R Block and tax software
    companies should have bank account information for the returns they
    processed. They could turn this data over to the Treasury but the
    CARES Act may limit the Treasury's ability to disburse payments. The
    CARES Act seems to only allow electronic disbursement to accounts the
    taxpayer has previously authorized. Taxpayers who regularly financed
    tax prep with RACs likely have not authorized disbursement to their
    own bank account or may not maintain an open bank account in regular
    use. Treasury probably has to lean on preparers and software companies
    to ensure that payments to RAC-financed returns are disbursed to the
    taxpayer bank accounts.

    The problems in doing a quick disbursal of Corona Cash highlight some deficiencies in the US payment and banking system. The House counterproposal to the CARES Act had in it a provision for the creation of FedAccounts–giving every consumer a bank account held at the Fed. It's kind of late in the game to try and set up such a system to deal with the corona virus crisis, but the crisis is exposing areas that need to be shored up going forward.