• Ronald Mann: Guest Blogger

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    Credit Slips welcomes Professor Ronald Mann as our inaugural guest blogger. He is the Ben H. & Kitty King Powell Chair in Business and Commercial Law and the Co-Director of the Center for Law, Business, and Economics at the University of Texas School of Law and an expert on credit card law and policy. While one of his more impressive achievements is arguably the distillation of his myriad accomplishments into a concise CV, I’ll be an obedient blogger and focus instead on the reason that I think his work is really important.  In a decade of scholarly research, Ronald has masterfully blended public and private law concerns to show how something as arcane and ominous sounding as a "payment system" shapes how consumers spend and borrow, and how these choices affect society. He marshals credible empirical data for his analyses and presents his findings in a balanced and measured way. Translation: he has thought long and hard about what’s good and what’s bad about credit cards and other payment devices, and he will make you think long and hard about the same. If you find his postings intriguing, read his just-released book Charging Ahead: The Growth and Regulation of Payment Card Markets Around the World. It’s accessible but sophisticated, and I commend it to Credit Slips readers.


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  • Guest Bloggers

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    Credit Slips will begin to feature guest bloggers who will join us for a week at a time. Beginning on Monday, September 18, we will be honored to have as a guest Ronald Mann, the Ben H. & Kitty King Powell Chair in Business and Commercial Law at the University of Texas. In October, we will be privileged to have contributions from Viviana Zelizer, the Lloyd Cotsen ’50 Professor of Sociology at Princeton University.

    We will not have guest bloggers every week, but we wanted to begin adding new voices and ideas to Credit Slips. The usual rules apply. Everyone is responsible for his or her own posts. Appearance on this blog as a regular or guest blogger does not imply that person agrees with or takes responsibility for any posts other than his or her own. Each blogger decides individually whether to allow comments to a post.

    We hope the guest bloggers will make this site even more valuable to our readers.


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  • Hold the CHAOS!

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    District Judge Marrero handed down his decision in the NWA appeal today.  He reversed the bankruptcy court and enjoined the union from implementing CHAOS (which, by the way, I was wrong to suggest would not involve mass walkouts).  "Court Tramples Right to Strike" is how the flight attendants cast it –see the flight attendants webpage.

    Let me say this: at over 100 pages, it is an extremely thoughtful analysis that really tries hard to cut through the seemingly conflicting goals of federal labor and bankruptcy policy here.  In essence, the judge said that Congress really wanted national railway carriers (and their modern-day airline analogues) to negotiate and negotiate and negotiate under the cumbersome and intentionally drawn-out provisions of Section 6 the Railway Labor Act for as long as possible, before giving up.  Only at that "Despondence Day" [my term, not a legal one] — when the Section 6 negotiating process has run its couse — can the parties resort to self-help (i.e., labor can strike).

    In bankruptcy, a debtor can change the rules somewhat: if it wins an 1113 motion, the debtor can change the terms of a labor CBA — even if it never negotiated up to Despondence Day under Section 6 of the RLA.  So the question is: if Congress had ever thought about the issue directly — which it never did, so a judge has to predict Congress’s intent — would it have analogized the granting of an 1113 motion as an "acceleration" to Despondence Day (in which case the labor State of Nature obtains and self-help is a go), or would it have seen an 1113 order as merely an "alteration" of the Section 6 negotiating environment: allowing the debtor to reject the CBA and alter some rules, but not excusing either party from finsishing the Section 6 dance before self-help?

    Given the desire to avoid strikes that was a "primary objective" of the RLA, Judge Marrero held that Congress would have probably wanted the latter: the parties have to keep slogging through Section 6 before self-help, even though the CBA has been rejected under section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code.

    But wait a minute!, cried the flight attendants, Northwest gets the best of both worlds: It gets self-help right away (after all, self-help for management *is* the unilateral imposition of labor terms), but the union’s hands are tied (no strike) until the end of Section 6.  How is that fair?

    It is fair, answered the judge.  Yes, management can impose unilateral terms, but not *any* unilateral terms; they are bound only to implement the terms of their last proposal in the 1113 process.  And by the way, recall that the only reason NWA won the 1113 motion is because the bankruptcy judge had to find that the union rejected that proposal without good cause.  So what at first blush may appear like unfairness is not nearly so one-sided as the flight attendants tried to paint.  That’s what I think Judge Marrero is trying to say in his book-length opinion and why the bankruptcy judge was reversed.

    This isn’t over yet: (1) on the litigation front, the union may appeal to the Second Circuit; and (2) on the negotiating front, they’ve got to continue with the Section 6 process with NWA.  Who knows, that still may end up going all the way to Despondence Day without an agreement.  And then, let slip the dogs of war!  But it may not.  Just maybe, if the Congress that designed the RLA correctly predicted that as tempers subside over time, voluntary agreements can work out, then NWA and the flight attendants will hunker down, hash something out, and put all this customer-irritating unrest behind them.  That’s what I’m hoping for.


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  • Tithing Overheats

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    There has been a heated press release and news coverage (Wash. Times, Salt Lake Tribune, Albany Times-Union) about a case called In re Diagostino. The bankruptcy court in Albany, New York, ruled that the Diagostinos could not make a charitable contribution of $100/month but instead had to pay that money to their creditors in chapter 13. This case has been cited as yet another example of the problems with the 2005 bankruptcy amendments. Your creditors now come before your church! No more tithing in chapter 13! What’s next? Didn’t the Republicans know they were taking money from churches and giving it to the credit card companies? For shame, Doc.

    The hype on the Diagostino case seems a little overblown. I’m no fan of the 2005 bankruptcy amendments. Never have so many been bought by so few for so much. That act could be the poster child for campaign finance reform. On this one, however, I’ll give the 2005 amendments a pass.

    First, the facts of the case do not support the rhetoric. The Statement of Financial Affairs, which is filed in every bankruptcy case, asks the debtor to list all charitable contributions made in the year before filing. The Diagostinos responded "None," making them not the first set of debtors to discover a sudden interest in charitable giving after filing bankruptcy. Also, the Diagostinos proposed to give $100/month in charitable contributions. There is no indication in the judicial opinion that the contributions were intended for a church. Indeed, the words "tithe" or "church" do not appear in the opinion, although the reasoning in the opinion would apply to tithes and church contributions. This is simply not a case of a couple with a long history of making charitable contributions to a church suddenly being deprived of this right in bankruptcy.

    Second, I am not known for my sympathy toward unpaid consumer lenders, but when one donates to a church or charity at the expense of creditors, one is not giving. The ethic of charity is to give of oneself. One of my favorite law review pieces is an essay by Dan Keating about the ethics of charitable giving in bankruptcy. As he writes:

    What has always puzzled me . . . is why debtors do not view their insistence on tithing while insolvent as simply trading one sin for another. I realize there is no "standard" Christian doctrine, but most Christian churches consider the Bible to be at least a primary source of moral and spiritual guidance. And just as the Bible supports the notion that its adherents ought to tithe, it also makes clear that repaying one’s legal debts is a significant moral obligation.

    Daniel Keating, Bankruptcy, Tithing, and Pocket-Picking Paradigm of Free Exercise, 1996 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1041.

    Third, on the doctrine, the judicial opinion is a plausible reading of the bankruptcy statute. It certainly is a literal reading of the statute. This is not the place to get into whether section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) incorporates section 707(b)(1) or what parts of section 1325(b)(2)(A)(ii) are covered by the income test in 1325(b)(3)(A). There are a lot of cross-referenced sections, and we have had a few posts suggesting the 2005 bankruptcy amendments were not the most artfully drafted provisions in the history of Western legal thought. (OK, there have been more than a few such posts.) For present purposes, suffice it to say that a reading of the statute that considered the Bankruptcy Code as a whole might have come to a different conclusion. For example, if the Diagostino opinion is correct, then high-income chapter 13 debtors no longer can pay the expenses of their business. That cannot possibly be what Congress intended as it would remove the ability of self-employed persons to fund a chapter 13 plan.

    If you want to read the Diagostino opinion for yourself, I have made a copy through the Credit Slips site. I could not find the opinion posted on the New York bankruptcy court’s web site. Click below

    Download diagostino.pdf

    UPDATE (9/22): For some reason, I am having trouble downloading the file with Mozilla Firefox, but I have no problems with Internet Explorer (sigh). Try Internet Explorer if you have trouble with the download.


  • Chickens in the Pot, Cars in the Garage, and Turkeys in the Law

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    Form22b_2 The 2005 bankruptcy amendments never cease to amaze me. Yesterday, we covered the means testing requirements in my bankruptcy class. I required the students to fill out the means testing forms using the information from a problem in the textbook. For the bankruptcy professors out there, this appears to have been an effective way to teach the material. For the nonbankruptcy types out there, the means test is a congressionally mandated comparison of income and expenses to determine whether a debtor is eligible for chapter 7. To do this comparison of income to expenses, Congress directed that the bankruptcy courts should use IRS guidelines developed to determine whether a taxpayer could afford to repay a delinquent tax debt.

    Unfortunately, I have to dig a little bit into the details to make my point. Currently, the IRS guidelines allow $471 in monthly payments for the ownership of "Vehicle 1" and $332 in monthly payments for the ownership of "vehicle 2." In our problem, the married couple owned two automobiles. On one auto they made a $610 monthly payment, and they were no longer making payments on the other auto. It matters not that they one vehicle free and clear. Under the IRS guidelines and the Bankruptcy Code, they were allowed to make two deductions as the ownership costs of having two vehicles. Here comes the rub. The auto lenders wanted Congress to make sure bankrupt debtors would still make that full monthly payment even after filing bankruptcy. Hence, under the bankruptcy law but not the IRS guidelines, the debtors could deduct the full $610 monthly payment they were actually making.

    Demonstrating why I am teaching law instead of practicing, I allocated the $610 payment to "vehicle 1" and claimed the statutory minimum of $332 on "vehicle 2." "Vehicle 1" means the newer, more expensive car, right? A student gently pointed out that definition was specified nowhere in the Bankruptcy Code or IRS guidelines. Indeed, the issue does not arise under the IRS guidelines because the amounts operate as caps, not minimums. If instead we designated the $610 payment to "vehicle 2," we get to use the statutory minimum of $471. Because one generally loses eligibility if there is $100/month left to pay creditors, the difference between a statutory minimum of $471 and $332 could be dispositive.

    By this point in the post, I suspect everyone has left the blog for other reading material. (I strongly recommended this from The Onion: "Florida State University To Phase Out Academic Operations By 2010.") If you have hung on, there is a bigger point. What did Congress think it was doing by incorporating these IRS guidelines into chapter 7? They are unworkable. Indeed, the reason that it is pedagogically effective to make the students fill out the forms is that it forces them to grapple with the minutiae of the statute and see the problems created by the 2005 amendments. Political forces swirled around the amendments’ enactment. Even if the amendments were not a policy disaster, they are a technical nightmare in their implementation. See Katie Porter’s excellent post on a related point.


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  • CHAOS Anyone?

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    As resident blogger from Michigan, I feel compelled to alert readers to the interesting labor developments at Northwest Airlines.  (Northwest "hubs" in Detroit and employs a good swath of people in this area.)

    A very complex issue of federal jurisdiction is unfolding regarding the intersection of federal bankruptcy law, federal labor law, federal court injunctive jurisdiction (the Norris-LaGuardia Act), and the specific provisions of the Railway Labor Act.  As the various airlines have gone through this round of bankruptcies, they have avoided this issue by settling with their respective unions by extracting voluntary concessions — so it has never been litigated.  Not so with the flight attendants at Northwest.  They are pushing this issue to an explosive head (unperturbed by Northwest’s effective ignoring of the earlier mechanics’ strike).

    The legal issue at dispute pertains to the ability of the attendants to strike.  As bankruptcy types know, federal bankruptcy law allows the judge to order the "rejection" of a collective bargaining agreement with a labor union upon request by the debtor, provided the debtor clears a hurdle showing need (a hurdle that is much more onerous than the general one required to reject a regular business contract).  NWA did indeed request to reject the flight attendant contract, made its showing, and was thus recently granted permission by the court.  With no CBA in place, NWA was unfettered by contract and could implement its own labor rules.  And it did.

    The thorny battle arises over what happens next: the union takes the position it can now initiate a strike, making the fairness argument that if management can impose unilateral work rules, workers should be able to respond with the "ultimate sanction" in labor disputes.  Management contends that this is not so, for reasons that are difficult to get down in bloggable format.  (If you really want to know, the argument depends in part upon the fact that to order rejection of a CBA, the bankruptcy judge must find that the union did not have good cause to reject the last offer in negotiations — which he necessarily did because he granted the motion — as well as the general duty to bargain in good faith in negotiating an initial CBA.)

    Management and the union went to court to thrash it out.  They argued passionately.  And a decision came down.  The Bankruptcy Court judge said the union could strike (more precisely, there was no jurisdiction to enjoin the flight attendants from striking).

    Victory for those who control the means of production?  Not quite — the ruling was immediately appealed.  In bankruptcy, an appeal goes to the federal district court in the relevant district (here, the Southern District of New York, i.e., Manhattan).  The District Court judge responded to the appeal by entering a temporary, limited injunction blocking the union from striking for the time being — until he has a chance to rule on the merits of the appeal.  Clinging desperately to the hope of a consensual resolution [that is my read], he asked the parties to tell him what the prospects for future discussions looked like.  NWA said they were still willing to talk; the flight attendants said they couldn’t see the point in more discussion.

    The District Court judge’s ruling in the appeal is expected shortly — although my prediction is the loser will probably turn around and appeal up the legal ladder to the presiding appellate court: the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (which sits in Manhattan and hears appeals from trial courts in New York, Vermont, and Connecticut).

    In the meantime, the flight attendants talk about a semi-strike, "CHAOS," which will entail random sickouts and slowdowns, but not an outright walkout.  For its part, NWA has recalled all furloughed flight attendants, which in better labor-relations times might have been good news; here it may be nothing more than a preemptive strategy to fend off possible strike-induced shortages.  I am waiting to see what happens, especially since it is not beyond comprehension that one of the bankrupt airlines will not survive chatper 11.  Will NWA’s labor dysfunction, I wonder, prove the key to its undoing?  We will see.

    Links: Flight Attendants Webpage.
              NWA Chapter 11 Webpage.
              Detroit Free Press.    (Journalist Jewel Gopwani has excellent, unbiased coverage.)


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  • Workload Up in Bankrutpcy Courts

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    An August report by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations contains a few interesting data nuggets about how BAPCPA is affecting the bankruptcy judicial system. A few quick highlights: 1) Preliminary analysis indicates that BAPCPA caused a 10 percent increase in the staffing requirements of the bankruptcy courts. The report notes that while courts will work harder, the effect on judges remains unclear.  2)  The AO apparently counted them up! The new law creates more than 35 different types of motions, objections and hearings that did not exist before. 3) The report offers that "most judges believe" that case filings will return to pre-BAPCPA levels.

    The aggregate effect of these changes is that the entire bankruptcy system will likely be bigger, more complex, and more costly in the future. The report has no answers about how to pay for the changes BAPCPA is bringing about in the court system, but does express concern that if the number of in forma pauperis debtors climbs from the 2% rate that has been established in the months immediately after BAPCPA, that this loss of filing fees could be a significant hit on the revenue available to run the bankruptcy courts.


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  • Welcome to the Blogosphere

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    A hearty welcome to the Consumer Law & Policy blog, which was launched on September 1. The blog is sponsored by Public Citizen’s Consumer Justice Project. Contributors are eleven law professors and attorneys who teach and practice consumer law. Rather than list them all here, you can find the contributors and links to their bios in the new blog’s first post. The blog will discuss issues of consumer law and policy. There already are posts on identity theft and debt collection.


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  • HMDA Data and Piggyback Lending

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    Federal Reserve researchers have a new paper in the Federal Reserve Bulletin evaluating the 2005 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data (if the prior link doesn’t work for you, try this).  For now, I would particularly direct readers’  attention to the analysis of piggyback lending on pp. A135-A138.


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  • Charge-Offs and Bankruptcy Filings

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    Chargeoff_2 There was some rumbling that it was odd that both credit card charge-offs and bankruptcies were down over the past year, or at least so I was told. (A "charge-off" occurs when a bank removes the account from its books as uncollectible and takes a loss.) Apparently, the reasoning was that charge-offs were alternatives to bankruptcy. A rise in one would correspond to a decrease in the other. It was not clear to me that this should be the case. It seemed more likely that charge-offs and bankruptcy filings were complementary. More bankruptcies meant more banks would charge-off credit card loans, and charge-offs could indicate future bankruptcy filings.

    A wild thought occurred to me, which was to look at the data and see what the historical trends were. The bankruptcy filing data, although problematic, are readily available from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, and the Federal Reserve tracks the charge-off data. The chart to the right tracks the year-to-year percentage change in the rates of total bankruptcy filings per capita and credit-card charge-offs. The red line represents credit-card charge offs, and the blue dots are for the bankruptcy filing rate. Click on the graphic for a slightly larger image.

    A few comments about the data are in order. First, the data are for 12-month periods ending June 30 of each year. In my own analyses of bankruptcy filing rates, I have always used that period because historical government statistics were computed over that time frame, which coincided with the federal government’s historical fiscal year. Continued use of that convention allows comparability with historical statistics. The credit-card charge-off data were taken from the Federal Reserve and represent seasonally adjusted data of charge-offs at all banks (click here for the data). The bankruptcy filing data are for total bankruptcy filings. It arguably might be better to use the government’s data for nonbusiness filings, but those data are problematic as I have previously blogged and written about with fellow blogger Elizabeth Warren (The Myth of the Disappearing Business Bankruptcy, 93 Cal. L. Rev. 745 (2005)).

    Looking at the graph, two things are readily apparent. First, I need to become more proficient with my statistical software, and second my university did not provide me with a decent graphics editing program (or I am just not any good with the software they did give me). Nevertheless, the graph reveals some interesting patterns. Most substantively, both statistics appear closely related and generally move in the same direction (r = 0.827). Also, credit-card charge-offs have much higher variance than do bankruptcy filings. The peaks and valleys of the charge-off line are much steeper than the corresponding peaks and valleys for the bankruptcy filing data. When charge-offs go down, they go down much more than do bankruptcy filings, and when they go up, they go up much more than bankruptcy filings.

    The higher variance is difficult to explain. A working hypothesis that I have is that bank regulatory cycles somehow interact with bankruptcy filing rates. As regulators push banks to clean up their bad loans, the banks may push people toward bankruptcy. As banks’ balance sheets look better, the regulators lay off, and consumers can borrow easier (and thus stave off bankruptcy for a while longer). That explanation would first show up (presumably) in banks’ charge-off decisions. Right now, it sounds like a great theory, but without data it’s only a theory.

    Credit card delinquency rates should also be related to bankruptcy filing rates. In theory, credit card delinquencies should precede and be predictive of bankruptcy filing trends. I will post soon with data comparing credit card delinquency rates with bankruptcy filings.


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