Tag: bankruptcy

  • Cross-Border Insolvency Forum Shopping Naivete

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    by Ted Janger and John Pottow

    Recently, two U.S. law professors and a third from Singapore offered unsolicited advice to the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) regarding that organization’s ongoing efforts to harmonize and modernize the law of cross-border insolvencies.  They wrote an open letter (the “Letter”) to the Secretariat—joined by a number of other academic signatories—that calls upon UNCITRAL to abandon one of the core principles of its Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency (the “MLCBI,” adopted as chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code): that, other things being equal, a cross-border bankruptcy case should be based where the debtor is located. 

    This principle is implemented by according special deference and comity to the insolvency case located at the debtor’s center of main interest (the “COMI”).  The debtor’s COMI is the jurisdiction where it carries out its activities and, hence, is the jurisdiction that is known and readily apparent to third parties.  It therefore is predictable.  The COMI principle thus has a lot to recommend it.  In most cases it will enhance the legitimacy of bankruptcy outcomes by simultaneously furthering administrative convenience, increasing transparency, vindicating creditor expectations, and respecting national sovereignty.  Like most rules of private international law, it is rooted in common sense.

    Notwithstanding COMI’s many virtues, the Letter’s authors recommend jettisoning COMI in favor of a regime of unfettered forum choice and jurisdictional competition; the main proceeding entitled to deference in a multinational insolvency should be freely selected by the debtor.

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  • The Role of Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in Addressing the Consequences of COVID19.

    Many businesses may require bankruptcy proceedings to assist in recovery from the CV Recession. In my view, the best legal approach to any Chapter 11 reforms necessitated by the emerging CV-induced economic crisis lies in building up from the Small Business Reorganization Act (SBRA) to cover more Small and Medium Enterprises (SME), rather than trying to adjust the general provisions of Chapter 11, the home of bankruptcies like General Motors and American Airlines. Our database at the Business Bankruptcy Project shows that in 2018 more than half of the businesses that filed in Chapter 11 in the Southern District of New York would fall under the temporary SBRA cap, $7.5 million.

    Most immediately, the recently voted funds for small business must be available in bankruptcy reorganization cases. We must remove any barrier to using them in that way. I start the study of Chapter 11 by reminding students that the clerk at the bankruptcy court does not hand out money. Bankruptcy does not produce funding, although it can help facilitate it in important ways. Thus there is no legal reform that will avoid the need for very substantial financing with implications far beyond reorganization procedures. Bankruptcy cannot help unless it can be used in connection with rescue funding.

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  • Elizabeth Warren & the Dow Corning Bankruptcy: Nothing to See

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    The Washington Post has a story about Senator Elizabeth Warren’s involvement in the Dow Corning bankruptcy that implies that Senator Warren was somehow working against the interests of personal injury victims. That’s rubbish, and it’s frankly irresponsible reporting that fundamentally fails to understand the bankruptcy process and leaves out a critical fact.

    Bankruptcies are complicated, so let me relate the Dow Corning story and then what we know of Senator Warren’s minimal involvement. Bottom line is that this is a complete nothing burger, much like the previous Washington Post story with the shocking headline (much mocked, and now amended) that then-Professor Warren had billed [a below-market] rate of $675/hr for her legal work

    Here's the properly related story in a nutshell: Senator Warren did some minimal work in support of a deal to ensure compensation for tort victims that was supported by the overwhelming majority (94%) of those tort victims and that was approved by a federal court. That’s a good thing that deserves praise, not some implicit shade.  Alas, the Post doesn't bother to mention the tort victim support for the plan. 

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  • The Commonwealth and the GOs, part 1

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    While there has been some press coverage of the recent attempts to annul some $6 billion of Puerto Rican general obligation bonds – essentially all such debt issued starting in 2012 onward – the move has not received much deep coverage. Yesterday I took some time to read the claims objection filed in the Commonwealth's article III case, and in this post I'm going to consider the arguments against the bonds' validity. In a further post, I will consider what is going on here from a strategic perspective.

    The objection was jointly filed by the creditors' committee and the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico, but the Board only joined in one of the two main arguments that are put forth. (There is a third argument in the objection – about OID and unmatured interest under section 502 fo the Code – that I'm not going to talk about because its rather pedestrian by comparison).

    In sum, the committee argues that GO bonds issued in 2012 and 2014 violated two provisions of Puerto Rico's constitution, and thus the bonds should be deemed void. The Board joins in the objection with regard to the first constitutional provision, but not the second. If successful, this objection would eliminate $6 billion of the $13 billion in GO bonds currently outstanding.

    More details after the break.

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  • Bankruptcy Lawyers Have Right to Work

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     In the debate in Wisconsin over the  Right to Work bill, the legislators opposed to the bill questioned why no businesses were testifying in support of the law, if it was–as stated–going to drive business growth.

    The Wisconsin Assembly got an answer when James Murray testified about the Right to Work bill. Mr. Murray explained that if passed, Right to Work would definitely increase his business: helping people file personal bankruptcy. Bankruptcy could become big business in Wisconsin, he said, noting that with a Right to Work law, Wisconsin could climb higher than 12th place on the per capita filing rate. 

    Enjoy 7 minutes of brilliant satire and bankruptcy humor, courtesy of You Tube. Hat tip to Professor Michelle Arnopol Cecil for sharing this with me.

     

  • New Resource: NCLC’s Bankruptcy Mortgage Project

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    The National Consumer Law Center has launched a useful new resource for the bankruptcy community called the Bankruptcy Mortgage Project. See here. Those likely to find it handy include judges, consumers, trustees, mortgage servicers, attorneys, and academics. The website, created with a grant from the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges’ Endowment for Education, collects all sorts of documents related to mortgage issues in consumer bankruptcy cases. It thus provides easy, free access to various local rules, forms, general orders, and court opinions.

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  • The Big Fail

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    Last week the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey issued an opinion in a case captioned Kemp v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.  This case looks like the first piece of evidence in what might turn out to be the Securitization Fail or, in homage to Michael Lewis, The Big Fail.

    Briefly, Countrywide as servicer filed a proof of claim for a mortgage in a bankruptcy case on behalf of Bank of New York as trustee for a securitization trust.  The bankruptcy court denied the claim because there was no evidence that Bank of New York ever owned the mortgage. The mortgage note had never been negotiated or delivered to Bank of New York, despite the requirement to do so in the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA) that governed the securitization of the loan.  That meant that Bank of New York as trustee had no interest in the loan, so the proof of claim filed on its behalf was disallowed. 

    This opinion could turn out to be incredibly important.  It provides a critical evidence for the argument that many securitization transactions simply failed to be effective because non-compliance with the terms of the transaction:  failure to properly transfer the mortgage meant that the mortgages were never actually securitized.  The rest of this post explains the chain of title issue in mortgage securitizations and how Kemp fits into the issue.  

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  • Chrysler and Foreclosures: the Contrast

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    Today it's reported that Chrysler has convinced its creditors to agree to modify its debt obligations.  Chrysler was able to do this in part because of the leverage it had by threatening to file for bankruptcy.  It's instructive to contrast the Chrysler situation to the situation of homeowners.  The voluntary home mortgage loan modifications are still not happening on the scale necessary to address the foreclosure crisis.  How different would the world look if homeowners had the leverage of bankruptcy to induce voluntary modifications? 

  • Whatever Happened to Bankruptcy?

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    It's hard to remember in the midst of the bailout craze, but the United States does have legal mechanisms for dealing with insolvency.  We have the FDIC system for banks and bankruptcy for everyone else just about.  These are well-established institutions.  There's a wealth of experience and caselaw about both.  We know how they work, and both are reasonably transparent and fair.  While they have some limitations, they have served the country well for years.

    And yet there has been a marked resistance in both the Bush and Obama administrations to putting banks into FDIC receivership and non-banks into the Chapter.  To be sure we had WaMu, Wachovia, and IndyMac cycled through the FDIC, and Lehman is wending its way through bankruptcy.  But the list of companies we haven't required to go through the ringer is equally impressive:  AIG, Citi, Bank of America, Bear Stearns, GM, Chrysler (and probably many of the financial institutions that took TARP funds).  

    All of this raises a couple important questions:  why have some institutions been allowed to go through the established legal regimes, while others have received ad hoc treatment?  Is there something about the FDIC process or bankruptcy that the Bush and Obama administrations think doesn't work?  If so, what is it? (And let's fix it if it's a problem.)   Or is it a matter of whose ox would get gored in these processes, but not in an ad hoc treatment?  Consider–the bonuses that were specially protected per Geithner's request in the EESA would just be general unsecured claims in bankruptcy or FDIC proceedings.  And implicit recourse to banks by investors in off-balance sheet entities (like SIVs) wouldn't stand a chance in FDIC proceedings because of the O'Doench doctrine (FDIC not bound by secret deals).  

    I'm bothered by the apparent lack of rhyme or reason for when we will use FDIC/Bankruptcy and when we won't.  It'd be nice to see the administration articulate why FDIC/bankruptcy aren't good options.  It can't just be a matter of funding–I'd much rather see the government as DIP lender than as the vulnerable preferred (or common) shareholder, bailing out bondholders.  

    [Hat tip to Stephen Lubben for inspiring these thoughts.]
  • Bankruptcy Bill Passes in the House

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    H.R. 1106, the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, which will allow modification of all types of mortgages in Chapter 13 bankruptcy, passed the House today by a vote of 234-191.  

    I haven't found a link yet with the vote breakdown or any other details, but will post more when I do.