Tag: strategic default

  • Principal Write-Down Pilot Program in Massachusetts

    Posted by

    Jean Braucher

    A Boston nonprofit, Boston Community Capital, is teaming up with some financial institutions, in particular Bank of America, in a pilot program that has the effect of writing down mortgages to close to home value. http://www.npr.org/2012/01/02/143601604/in-mortgage-crisis-some-banks-agree-to-cut-losses

    BCC says it works with qualifying homeowners and banks to buy underwater homes, either in short sales or at foreclosure, and then sells them back to owners at just above current market value. The nonprofit takes the risk of making the resale and allows those buying back to use their own lender or a mortgage company that BCC works with. See the program’s FAQs: http://www.sunhomehelp.org/faq/sun

    BCC is playing a gatekeeping role as far as who qualifies (there must be an ability to pay the written-down loan but an inability to pay the original loan). Also, BCC may have better credibility with distressed homeowners than financial institutions such as B of A do. The pilot is supposed to test whether such a program can be run without promoting “strategic default,” according to the NPR story.

    Principal write-down is much needed relief to stabilize the housing market and reduce the lose-lose impact of foreclosure, so this is a pilot worth watching. A concern, however, is whether we can trust any reports that come out about it. There does not seem to be any neutral third-party such as an academic researcher studying what happens in the program. Also, a supposed fact cited in the NPR story is unattributed and highly doubtful—that 30 percent of private home loan modifications last year involved principal write-down. That certainly wasn’t true of the government-sponsored Home Affordable Modification Program, so if true about private modifications, it raises even more questions about the troubled HAMP.

  • People Are Not Corporations, and Financial Journalists Are Not Ordinary People

    Posted by

    Jean Braucher

    It is getting really old, the exasperation of entitled financial journalists that ordinary folks are not walking away from their underwater homes as much as they supposedly should. The latest to sound this tired refrain is James Surowiecki in The New Yorker (Living By Default, Dec. 19, 2011), who also makes the clichéd comparison to corporate decisions to shed debt using chapter 11 bankruptcy. He calls on underwater homeowners to do "the smart thing" by walking away.

    According to Mitt Romney, “Corporations are people.” Whether or not you agree with that proposition, what is empirically true when it comes to debt is that people are not corporations. People don’t view walking away from debts that they can afford as a no brainer if it improves the bottom line. They agonize. They feel bad. They care about their homes and neighborhoods. Walking away is extremely painful, not a simple financial calculation. And, oh by the way, the further down you are in the 99 percent, the more likely that the financial calculation is negative, given impact on credit reputation from defaulting on a mortgage when your income is low. (On the other hand, many people worry about their credit reputations way after they have hit bottom and bankruptcy could actually improve their access to credit, more evidence that people don't take bankruptcy or any other form of walking away lightly.)

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  • What’s Eating Todd Zywicki?

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    Adam Levitin

    It's no secret that there's no love lost between Todd Zywicki and Elizabeth Warren.   But Todd's latest salvo in this feud is simply filled with inaccuracies.

    Todd goes after Elizabeth for (1) her medical bankruptcy research, (2) the Two-Income Trap, and (3) the treatment of strategic defaults in Congressional Oversight Panel reports.  Todd's charges in (1) and (2) are just rewarmings of his past critiques of Elizabeth's work and of Meghan McArdle's botched hatchet job of Elizabeth in the Atlantic for which she was taken to the woodshed by numerous observers (see also here and here, for example).

    But what about the Congressional Oversight Panel's treatment of strategic defaults? Here, Todd's claim is demonstrably false.

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  • Getting Rid of Nonrecourse Mortgages?

    Posted by

    Adam Levitin

    It's interesting to look at some of the reader comments to the NY Times article about the rich being more likely to default on their mortgages.  A lot of them are aghast that a mortgage might not be full recourse–that one can walk away and have no personal liability.  What happened to one's word being their bond, honor, etc?  

    Since the onset of the mortgage crisis, some commentators (starting with Martin Feldstein in 2008) have been discovering to their horror that a lot of mortgage lending is nonrecourse.  They think this situation is an invitation to moral hazard and argue that we should do away with nonrecourse mortgages and otherwise punish strategic defaulters (without ever saying how we identify a strategic default–not everyone who walks away from an underwater property is a strategic defaulter…)  Putting aside the issue that a lot of mortgages are recourse, I don't think these commentators have fully thought through the implications of doing so.  

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  • Are the Rich More Likely to Default on Their Mortgages?

    Posted by

    Adam Levitin

    The NY Times has an article about mortgage default rates being higher on larger (>$1M) mortgages than on small mortgages.  The argument suggested by the article is that the rich are more likely to see their homes simply as investments.  Put a different way, the consumption utility component of the home is relatively less important to the rich.  A house has two value components–it's an investment, and it is also a consumable (but durable) product.   The consumption value of a home is basically the same for everyone–I might derive more or less utility from any particular house, but it is all within a relatively constrained range, and my range is probably around the same as everyone else's.  That means that the consumption value component of a house is largely fixed, regardless of the house's price.  The more expensive the house, the smaller the ratio of the consumption value to the investment value.  Therefore, it would follow that people with more expensive houses place more value on the investment component and treat the house more like an investment.  

    I think that's correct, but I also think there's more going on and wish that the analysis in the article had dug deeper because it has unfortunately fed into a narrative of the mortgage crisis being one of strategic default by ruthless investors, with the corollary being that they do not merit any government assistance and even deserve opprobrium or punishment (although they are only playing by the rules of the game, which should have been priced in by lenders).  Here's what I wish the story had pointed out:

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